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1. Introduction 
The extensive use in many countries of cash transfers from governments to individuals is motivated by 
redistribution from the rich to the poor and/or social insurance to make lifetime careers safer. Welfare 
transfers are subject to different degrees of targeting, in the range from universalism to transfers that 
are means-tested for each individual. There is a vast literature analyzing universal redistributive 
subsidies and transfers that are targeted to a specified subset of the population.1 The majority of these 
studies rely on the assumption that targeted transfers are equally distributed within the group of 
beneficiaries, whereas minor attention has been paid to the study of public transfers that are means-
tested and targeted at the individual level. In the latter case the government has to determine total 
spending as well as allocation of transfers on individuals. 
 
Researchers and public sector practitioners typically advocate divergent views on distributional 
policies. Economists argue that politicians may pursue policies that are socially inefficient by biasing 
policy in the favor of lobby groups or "responsive" voter groups, while pressure groups have strong 
incentives to extract public benefits for themselves and send the bill to taxpayers. Politicians and 
bureaucrats, on the other hand, may want to emphasize the credibility and legitimacy of public services 
and transfers. They argue that the allocation of public transfers should not be arbitrary or corrupt, but 
should be based on legal regulations and professional evaluation of the individual need for welfare 
benefits. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis where these two perspectives are combined. To this 
end we utilize data for social assistance in Norway, where the responsibility for social assistance to 
citizens with low incomes is decentralized to the local government level. Although the provision of 
social assistance is regulated by the Social Services Act, local governments have considerable 
discretion to accept or reject applicants, and to determine the level and distribution of cash transfers. 
Thus, social assistance is an important instrument for income redistribution at the local government 
level in Norway. 
 
Hypotheses about variation in political support for redistribution across municipalities are derived 
from three different theories. The ideology/partisan model emphasizes the impact of representatives' 
ideology and the party composition in local government councils. The pressure group/stakeholder 
model focuses on the competing claims of different age groups over a fixed local government budget, 
                                                 
1 For an overview, see Persson and Tabellini (2000). 
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since - besides of social assistance - local governments in Norway also provide services like primary 
education and care for the elderly. The distance/diversity model states that a majority of citizens has 
preferences for redistribution to the poor, while the intensity of these preferences tends to decrease 
with geographical, social and cultural diversity within the local jurisdiction. 
 
In addition to these political theories there are also other possible explanations for variation in local 
government spending on social assistance. Local governments in Norway face a budget constraint, 
where the available resources are used to provide different services and social assistance to the poor. 
Thus the total exogenous income is constraining the choice set of local governments. If social 
assistance is a normal good, then it follows that transfer payments increase in response to increased 
local government incomes. By contrast, higher unit costs in local government service production may 
reduce the supply of social assistance. 
 
Different priorities of social assistance across municipalities may also arise from differences in the 
social and demographic composition of the population. These differences may give rise to different 
individual economic opportunities and need for social assistance. Moreover, the community 
opportunity hypothesis makes the observation that the local need for social assistance is not entirely 
captured by individual characteristics, since the opportunities for economic self-support also depend 
on the distribution of human capital and other characteristics of the local environment. 
 
An advantage of the approach in the present paper is that the empirical model is derived directly from 
the theoretical model. Moreover, the analysis combines individual-specific data with data at the 
municipal level, and this makes it possible to disentangle the impact of recipient needs from the impact 
of local preferences for redistribution. While recipient needs are captured by individual-specific 
variables, the impact of variation in political support for redistribution is captured by municipal-
specific variables. 
 
Our rich set of information, which includes data for 2.5 million individuals and 435 municipalities in 
1998, provides a suitable setting for testing different hypotheses about local government behavior. 
Analyses that exclusively utilize data on the municipal level may create confusion when estimates are 
either interpreted as the impact of local preferences on redistribution, or as the impact of national 
norms and regulations prescribing that welfare benefits should be allocated according to recipient 
need. A multi-level analysis makes it possible to discriminate between hypotheses that concern 
priorities across individuals as opposed to priorities across municipalities. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates a theory of local government decision-making 
with particular focus on the distribution of cash transfers for individuals. Theories that may explain 
municipality level variation in political support for redistribution are discussed in Section 3. The 
empirical model is specified in Section 4, and the estimation results are reported in Section 5. In 
Section 6 inequality in the personal income distribution in Norway is decomposed by expected and 
residual variation in social assistance and other sources of income. A brief summary and conclusion is 
given in Section 7. 
 
2. A community preference model of targeted transfers 
Means-testing signifies that welfare benefits are allocated on the basis of evaluation of need or the 
economic opportunities of citizens to provide for themselves. Thus, benefits are targeted to individuals 
(or families) and depend on individual characteristics. The common view in political economics is that 
narrowly defined groups have strong incentives to extract public benefits for themselves when the cost 
is diffused in society at large. However, the heterogeneity and lack of organization of the poor implies 
that they have low ability to accomplish coordinated political action. In the case of targeted transfers 
based on criteria that are individual-specific rather than group-specific, potential recipients also have 
conflicting interests, since they are competing over a limited pool of available public funds. 
Furthermore, since the distribution of benefits are determined by local governments by procedures of 
means-testing, the probability of receiving benefits is supposed to increase with decreasing means. 
Thus, we assume that local governments pay benefits to those who satisfy specified criteria. 
 
In addition to social assistance, local governments in Norway also provide public services. These 
services are assumed to be targeted towards different socio-demographic groups, with equal 
distribution of benefits within each group. This assumption is adopted to simplify the modeling 
framework. Otherwise it would be required to specify the distribution of in-kind benefits on 
individuals. Moreover, this assumption works as a reasonable approximation for the education sector, 
since primary schools are obligatory for children in the age group 6-15 years. Education is one of the 
major services provided by municipalities in Norway. For other service sectors we do not know the 
exact distribution of services on individuals, but we are able to define recipient groups by socio-
demographic characteristics. 
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The model is based on the "community preference" approach, which assumes that a local authority can 
be treated like a household that maximizes utility under a given budget constraint.2 A further 
discussion of whose preferences are represented in local government decision-making is provided in 
Section 3. Local government preferences (Uj) are assumed to include the production of services and 
the allocation of cash benefits on individuals as arguments,3 and are specified as a Stone-Geary utility 
function 
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x≤γ  and )j,i(sijij ∀≤α . Service output is given by jx , and nj is the number of residents in 
municipality j. Social assistance to individual i in municipality j is denoted by ijs , and ijα  is the 
minimum requirement of social assistance, which is also called subsistence expenditure. The minimum 
required quantity of service output per capita is captured by jγ . The parameter β  is the marginal 
budget share of social assistance, which is assumed constant. For simplicity the model includes social 
assistance transfers and only one sector for service production. Preferences for high service output and 
high welfare transfers are defined on a per capita basis to make municipalities of different size 
comparable. The local government budget constraint on a per capita basis is defined by 
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where local government incomes, jy , are given as exogenous grants from the central government, and 
the price per unit of services in municipality j is jp . It is assumed that 0>jx  and 0-≥sij , which means 
that corner solutions are allowed for social assistance. Utility maximization subject to the budget 
constraint is formulated as a Kuhn-Tucker maximization problem 
 
                                                 
2 For a discussion of the community preference model, see Wildasin (1986). 
3 This model is similar to the model used by Langørgen (2004), where the purpose is to analyze the distribution of in-kind 
benefits in local public home-care services. The present paper employs the model as a basis for analyzing the distribution of 
cash transfers, and includes an extensive analysis of the political support for redistribution.  
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where the first order conditions are given by 
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From (2.4a)-(2.4c) we get the following supply function for social assistance4 
 
(2.5)  ]0),α
n
1γp
n
y
β(max[αs ∑jn
1i
ij
j
jj
j
j
ijij
=
+= . 
 
The model is a linear expenditure system (LES) with potential corner solutions. Discretionary income 
per capita is defined by exogenous income above the sum of subsistence expenditures, and is given by 
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= . Individual i in municipality j may receive social assistance if the subsistence 
expenditure for this individual is positive, or if discretionary income is positive in the municipality. To 
account for heterogeneity, we introduce z1i as a vector of individual-specific variables and tj as a 
vector of municipality-specific variables. Furthermore, subsistence expenditures are assumed to vary 
as functions of these variables, as specified by the function θtαz j1i +=ijα , where 1α  and θ  are 
vectors of parameters. By inserting *jy  and the specification of ijα  in equation (2.5) the supply of 
social assistance is given by 
 
(2.6)  ]0,max[]0,ymax[s *jij 22j11ij11i αzαzθtαz +=β++= . 
                                                 
4 We assume that the allocation of social assistance is entirely determined from the supply-side. The model could be 
extended to account for the choices of individuals as to whether or not to apply for social assistance. However, since there 
is no available register of applicants, we do not include such a role for the demand-side. 
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The expected cash transfer to individual i in municipality j is increasing with individual need, per 
capita discretionary income and support for redistribution in the local community. Variables in the 
vector z1i capture individual economic opportunities and need for social assistance, while variables in 
the vector jt  capture variation in the political support for redistribution within different municipalities, 
and are justified on the basis of alternative theories discussed in Section 3. Due to heterogeneity across 
municipalities in total per capita subsistence expenditures ( ∑α+γ
i
ij
j
jj n
1p ), discretionary income ( *jy ) 
is a function of both municipal income and municipality-specific variables that affect expenditure 
needs. Note that in (2.6) the variables on the municipal level are included in the vector )y,( *jj2j tz = , 
with a corresponding vector of parameters '' ),( β= θα 2 . 
 
3. Political support for social assistance 
Social assistance in Norway is targeted to a small minority on the basis of means-testing. Low voter 
participation among the poor implies that their welfare is not expected to be heavily weighted by vote-
share maximizing political parties. Moreover, the beneficiaries are not a well-organized group, which 
is able to form a lobby or to be agenda setter. Thus it seems that the obligation of local governments to 
provide social assistance has been introduced because the general electorate has preferences for 
redistribution to the poor. This may happen if voters are altruistic or if welfare policy is seen as a 
social insurance scheme, designed to make lifetime careers safer. 
 
This section provides a brief discussion of three political theories that are based on different 
assumptions about how local government preferences are formed. Different hypotheses are derived 
with respect to which types of communities are expected to provide high or low political support for 
redistribution. Furthermore, a fourth category of hypotheses explains priorities across municipalities 
by higher need/support for social assistance in communities that provide bad economic opportunities, 
which means that the population in each municipality is considered as a peer group. 
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3.1 The ideology/partisanship model 
Many empirical analyses of voting behavior have found significant ideology and partisan effects, see 
e.g. Kau and Rubin (2002).5 Partisan effects may occur in representative democracy when politicians 
are directly motivated by the policy outcomes. In cases where commitment to a policy platform ahead 
of the elections is not binding, the candidates' ideological preferences influence the policy outcome, 
since a dominant party or coalition of parties is able to implement its preferred policy after the 
elections. Moreover, in legislative bargaining within a parliamentary system, parties with agenda 
setting power are able to tilt the policy outcome in the direction of their preferred alternative, see 
Romer and Rosenthal (1978) and Baron and Ferejohn (1989). 
 
Elections for local government councils are held every fourth year in Norway. Voters are represented 
by political parties in proportion to shares of the votes in a multi-party system. In most cases policy 
conflict is organized along a traditional left-right dimension, where the division between socialists and 
non-socialists is important for coalition building to form a majority of representatives. Consequently 
we include the share of representatives from socialist parties as a variable that explains the political 
support for social assistance. Such welfare benefits are in line with the socialist program for 
redistribution from the rich to the poor. Thus, the local governments' priority of social assistance is 
expected to increase with the share of socialist representatives, assuming that the distribution of need 
and economic opportunities is properly controlled for at the individual level. 
 
3.2 The pressure group/stakeholder model 
A large share of local government services in Norway is targeted towards different age groups. While 
kindergartens and primary education provide benefits for families with children, municipal health care 
and care for the elderly is first and foremost given to the elderly. Thus, Borge and Rattsø (1995) 
assume that different age groups are rivals, since they have conflicting claims over the allocation of a 
fixed local government budget on different services. Different age groups are fighting for pieces of a 
given pie. 
 
Becker (1983) argues that the political influence of pressure groups can be expanded by expenditures 
of time and money on campaign contributions, political advertising, and in other ways that exert 
political pressure. Craig and Inman (1986) assume that the desired allocation of local public 
                                                 
5 Partisan effects are also found in studies of local government behavior in Norway, see Borge (1995) and Aaberge and 
Langørgen (2003). 
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expenditures is a weighted average of each interest group's preferred outcome. The preferences of 
different interest groups are weighted by their numerical strength. We may extend this model to 
account for the political priority of social assistance. A high share of elderly or children in the 
population is then expected to reduce the political support for social assistance. The reason for this is 
that the elderly and families with children have a higher stake in services targeted to the old and the 
young than in social assistance where the recipient group is rather small and heterogeneous. 
 
An alternative interpretation of the competing claims of different recipient groups is that a high share 
of elderly or children simply increases the subsistence expenditures required to provide a minimum 
standard of public services. Aaberge and Langørgen (2003) estimate local government subsistence 
expenditures within a linear expenditure system that includes 8 service sectors. Thus, to control for the 
impact of minimum service standards, we adjust the exogenous income of local governments for 
estimated subsistence expenditures.6 Any additional impacts of the population shares of children or 
elderly are consequently interpreted within the pressure group/stakeholder model. 
 
3.3 The distance/diversity model 
In the fiscal federalism literature redistribution is typically viewed as a task of the central government. 
However, in most federal countries local governments do have some discretion in redistribution policy. 
The main theoretical argument for this is that redistribution may be a local public good (Pauly, 1973). 
This is true when voters have other-regarding motivations that reflect altruism or fairness 
considerations, and when there is a spatial dimension in the motivation for redistribution. Localness 
means that the rich care more about the poor when they live nearby. An alternative interpretation is 
that the majority is willing to support the poor in order to reduce crime and other negative externalities 
from poverty. Furthermore, it is likely that such externalities tend to decrease with the distance to the 
problem. Thus the support for local government redistribution decreases with spatial distances between 
residents within local jurisdictions. This line of argument has been extended by Ashworth et al. (2002) 
to include social, cultural and political distances between local residents. They find that increasing 
local distances imply less redistribution by local governments. 
 
In the Norwegian setting several measures of geographical, social and cultural distances are available. 
Geographical distances are captured by average traveling time to the municipal center. Social and 
                                                 
6 Subsistence expenditures vary as a function of variables that account for aggregate needs and unit costs in different 
service sectors.  
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cultural distance is proxied by the spread in the education level and the share of immigrants with a 
remote cultural background (from non-industrialized countries). Moreover, we include the gross 
migration per capita since a high population turnover is expected to reduce social cohesion and support 
for local redistribution. We also include population size to test the hypothesis that there is more 
support for social assistance in smaller municipalities, since a larger share of the residents is unknown 
to each other in larger communities. 
 
3.4 Community opportunity 
The Social Services Act in Norway obliges local governments to support individuals and families that 
lack the necessary means for a decent living. Thus, the probability of receiving social assistance 
depends on individual characteristics that constrain the economic opportunities of each individual. 
However, the economic opportunities of individuals are also likely to be affected by characteristics of 
the local environment. Consequently one may treat the population in each municipality as a peer 
group. High quality of the peer group increases the economic opportunities and decreases the 
probability of receiving social assistance for each individual. In a municipality with a low quality of 
the peer group the risk of becoming a social assistance client is relatively high, which may yield higher 
need for social assistance. 
 
The quality of the peer group is measured by the share of the adult population with a low education 
level, the share of the adult population receiving disablement benefits from the central government, the 
local rate of unemployment, the number of alcohol related hospitalizations per capita, the population 
growth 1993-1998, and the share of the adult population in the age group 67 years and above. Higher 
population growth is assumed to imply better economic opportunities, while higher levels of the other 
variables means that economic opportunities are worse. Note that the community opportunity 
hypothesis implies that a high share of elderly reduces economic opportunities and increases social 
assistance, whereas the pressure group/stakeholder model assumes that a high share of elderly 
increases the political support for services that are targeted towards the elderly. The support for social 
assistance is consequently reduced, since most clients belong to younger age groups. 
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4. Empirical model 
4.1. A stochastic model for the supply of social assistance 
In Section 2 the municipal supply function of social assistance was derived from maximization of the 
utility function of the municipality, given a fixed budget constraint. Thus, the municipalities have 
preferences for transfers of social assistance to their residents. In this sense, giving social assistance to 
some individuals generates utility for the municipality. In addition to the observable characteristics the 
model for supply of social assistance is extended to include unobservable characteristics, ijε . These 
unobservable characteristics are supposed to be stochastic. Thus the empirical specification of the 
supply function for social assistance to individual i living in municipality j is given by the following 
Tobit model 
 
(4.1) ( )0,maxS ijij ε++= 22j11i αzαz ,  2j1i zz ,|ijε ~ ( )2,0NIID σ  m,,.........1j n,,.........1i j==  
 
where z1i and z2j denote individual-specific and municipality-specific variables, respectively. The error 
term ijε  is assumed to be independent of z1i and z2j and to be normally distributed. As can be seen from 
(2.6) and (4.1) the empirical model is closely connected to the theoretical model in Section 2. The 
parameters of the model are estimated on the basis of maximum likelihood, see the Appendix. 
 
To simplify notation we define the vectors ),( 2j1iij zzz =  and ''' ),( 21 ααα = , which include all the 
variables in the model and the corresponding parameters. Quantities of particular importance are the 
conditional expected amount of social assistance, ( )ijz|SE ij , and the conditional probability of 
receiving social assistance, ( )ijz|0SP ij > .  From equation (4.1) it follows that 
 
(4.2) ( ) ( ) ( )/σσ/σ|SE ij αzφαzαzΦz ijijijij += , 
 
where ( )⋅φ  is the standard normal density and ( )⋅Φ  is the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function. Furthermore, it follows that the conditional probability of receiving social assistance is given 
by 
 
(4.3) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )/σ|/σ/σP|P|0SP ijijij αzΦzαzzαzz ijijijijijij =>ε=>ε=> . 
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4.2 Heterogeneous individuals and municipalities 
In order to estimate the model in (4.1), we have to specify the variables (z1i) that account for the 
individual need for social assistance, and the variables (z2j) that account for economic constraints and 
priorities on the municipal level. The need for social assistance depends on the frequency of bad 
economic opportunities that varies across subgroups in the population. Thus it is relevant to focus on 
characteristics that may discriminate between individuals according to economic opportunities. Such 
characteristics are age, gender, education level, country background, family status, disablement status, 
unemployment status and maintenance payment status. Empirical evidence suggests that the following 
statuses increase the expected social assistance transfer: young, male, single or single parent, poorly 
educated, immigrant with background from non-industrialized country, disabled, long-term 
unemployed, and separated/divorced parent that pays for child maintenance. Basic statistics for the 
individual-specific variables are shown in Table 4.1. The table shows the proportion with different 
characteristics in the population and among recipients of social assistance, and the proportion of each 
subgroup that receives social assistance, and the average amount of received social assistance for the 
different groups. 
 
Disability pension and basic and supplementary benefits are parts of the National Insurance Scheme in 
Norway. Persons that have lost the ability to work because of illness or disablement get a disability 
pension. The basic benefit compensates for extraordinary expenses because of illness or disablement. 
When the diagnosis implies a need for more help and care at home one may also receive 
supplementary benefit. Persons that are not counted as disabled may receive basic and supplementary 
benefits. 
 
When parents are separated or divorced, one of the parents are usually given the main responsibility 
for the children and the children live with this parent. However, the other parent (normally the father) 
has the legal duty to provide economic support for the children (and their mother). Thus, one of the 
parents is paying maintenance support to the other (divorced) family members. Such expenditures may 
affect the payer's standard of living and may yield a higher need for social assistance. 
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Table 4.1. Distribution of individual characteristics and social assistance, 1998 
Variable Group/State Frequency  Frequency  Percent of  Average  
  distribution in distribution subpopulation received social 
    percent of pop. of recipients that are recipients assistance (NOK)
Gender Female 49.4 46.2 3.7 800
 Male 50.6 53.8 4.2 1 240
      
Country background Norwegian 92.6 84.2 3.6 860
 Western countries 5.3 7.3 5.4 1 640
  Non-Western countries 2.1 8.5 16.2 6 980
      
Education level Lower education 17.0 27.6 6.4 1 770
 Medium education 56.5 65.5 4.6 1 580
 Higher education 26.5 6.9 1.0 250
      
Family status Single 24.1 52.2 8.5 2 470
 Married without children 15.0 2.6 0.7 180
 Married with children 44.8 15.6 1.4 350
 Mother with children 7.6 20.2 10.5 2 140
 Father with children 1.7 2.6 6.0 1 410
 Cohab., at least one common child 6.8 6.9 4.0 810
      
Age group Below 30 years  22.8 37.5 6.5 1 500
 30-45 years 36.9 40.6 4.3 1 270
 45-66 years 40.4 21.9 2.1 530
      
Basic and supplem. benefit Basic and supplem. benefit 3.0 5.9 7.6 1 210
 No basic and supplem. benefit 97.0 94.1 3.8 1 020
      
Child maintenance Pay maintenance 4.9 16.0 12.9 2 350
 Do not pay maintenance 95.1 84.0 3.5 960
      
Disability Disabled 9.4 15.7 6.6 850
 Not disabled 90.6 84.3 3.7 1 040
      
Long-term unemployed Long-term unemployed 5.3 27.1 20.2 5 720
  Not long-term unemployed 94.7 72.9 3.0 760
 
Variables that capture local political support for redistribution were discussed in Section 3 above. 
Moreover, the subsistence expenditure for social assistance is also expected to increase with the local 
price level of housing, since local governments are supposed to compensate recipients for higher costs 
in the local housing market. 
 
The theoretical model in Section 2 suggests that the supply of social assistance depends on per capita 
discretionary incomes as defined within the linear expenditure system. Discretionary incomes are 
defined by exogenous incomes above a subsistence expenditure level, which means that exogenous 
incomes are adjusted for estimated costs to provide a standard package of public services. 
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In order to identify discretionary incomes it is necessary to estimate a simultaneous model that 
accounts for local public service production as well as social assistance. Aaberge and Langørgen 
(2003) have estimated discretionary incomes on the basis of a linear expenditure system that includes 
eight different service sectors.7 The analysis takes into account heterogeneity in sector-specific 
subsistence expenditures, which are assumed to vary with a number of socio-demographic and 
geographic variables. Since the analysis by Aaberge and Langørgen (2003) is exclusively based on 
data that are municipality-specific, their analysis does not account for the allocation of social 
assistance on individuals. However, we utilize this previous study to derive estimates of discretionary 
incomes for Norwegian municipalities in 1998. An advantage of this approach is that the partial model 
for social assistance that is estimated below is consistent with a more general, structural and 
simultaneous model for local government behavior. 
 
Table 4.2. Summary statistics for variables on the municipal level, 1998 
Variable N* Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Discretionary income per capita (1000 NOK) 434 9.84 8.31 0.00 80.71
Average municipal housing price per square meter (1000 NOK) 434 5.07 1.47 3.33 13.77
Percent socialists in the local government council 434 37.37 14.10 0.00 82.80
Population share 0-15 years 434 0.21 0.02 0.15 0.30
Population share 67 years and above 434 0.16 0.04 0.07 0.28
Average traveling time to the municipal center (minutes) 434 13.76 10.91 0.52 108.98
Spread in the education level (standard deviation in years of schooling) 434 2.22 0.21 1.81 3.23
Population share of non-western immigrants 434 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.05
Gross migration per capita 434 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.18
Population share with low education 434 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.17
Population growth 1996-1998  434 -0.27 4.70 -14.67 17.28
Unemployment rate (percent) 434 1.06 0.56 0.24 4.39
Population share that is disabled 434 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.11
Alcohol related hospitalizations per inhabitant 429 0.0012 0.0007 0.0001 0.0043
Inverse population size (in 1000 inhabitants) 434 0.34 0.34 0.00 2.92
The logarithm of the population 434 8.47 1.07 5.84 13.12
* All municipalities in Norway are included, except the smallest municipality (Utsira). 
 
Summary statistics for all the municipality level variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 
4.2. As can be seen from the table these variables indicate that there is substantial observable 
heterogeneity across municipalities. Thus, these variables are potential sources of differing priorities of 
social assistance across communities. 
                                                 
7 The major part of local government incomes in Norway is general grants-in-aid from the central government and local 
income and property taxes. The tax rates as well as the tax bases are determined by the central government. For this reason 
both grants and tax incomes are treated as exogenous in the model. 
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5. Empirical results 
The analysis is based on Norwegian data for individuals aged 16-66 years (children are supported by 
their parents and the elderly are supported by the national pension system). The data set is a cross-
section of individuals and municipalities in 1998. Three alternative Tobit models are estimated:8 
 
1. Model 1 uses only the individual characteristics as explanatory variables. The individual 
characteristics explain variation in the individual need for social assistance. 
2. In Model 2 the same individual characteristics are included, and explanatory variables on the 
municipal level are also included. 
3. Model 3 is a model with individual characteristics as explanatory variables and a dummy variable 
for each municipality except for Oslo, which is the reference municipality in this regression. 
 
The estimated coefficients for the individual characteristics are displayed in Table 5.1 for the three 
models, whereas the estimated coefficients for the municipal characteristics in Model 2 are presented 
in Table 5.3. 
 
5.1 Priorities across individuals 
The estimation results for the individual characteristics in Table 5.1 demonstrate that the three 
different Tobit models yield coefficients that are quite stable in sign and magnitude. The sign of the 
coefficients shows the direction of the effect on social assistance. Each of the coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 5 percent significance level. The table shows that males have higher 
probability of receiving social assistance and that they receive more assistance than females. 
Furthermore, non-western immigrants receive more social assistance than Norwegians and immigrants 
with a western country background. People with low education receive more social assistance than 
those with higher education. We have divided the population into six different family categories. The 
three statuses that receive relatively high amounts of social assistance are singles, lone mothers with 
children, and lone fathers with children. Married couples tend to receive small amounts of social 
assistance. It is found that persons below 30 years of age receive more social assistance than those 
above 30 years of age. Moreover, people with basic and supplementary benefits, those paying child 
maintenance benefits, the disabled and the long-term unemployed receive more social assistance than 
people not having such characteristics. 
                                                 
8 The results for the probability of receiving social assistance using a logit model with the same explanatory variables are 
shown in the Appendix. 
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Table 5.1. Tobit regressions. Coefficients for the individual characteristics 
Dependent variable: Received social assistance (in 1000 NOK)    
      
Variable Group/State Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant   -151.48 -139.01 -147.41
     
Gender Female 0.00 0.00 0.00
 Male 8.50 8.60 8.60
     
Country background Norwegian 0.00 0.00 0.00
 Western countries 13.72 13.27 13.02
  Non-Western countries 49.02 47.77 47.47
     
Education level Lower education 17.53 17.52 17.49
 Medium education 0.00 0.00 0.00
 Higher education -33.81 -34.27 -34.28
     
Family status Single 57.49 56.92 56.92
 Married without children 0.00 0.00 0.00
 Married with children 11.70 12.21 12.33
 Mother with children 53.03 52.88 52.98
 Father with children 42.04 42.10 42.17
 Cohabitation with at least one common child 30.59 30.70 30.99
     
Age group Below 30 years  7.56 7.60 7.60
 30-45 years 0.00 0.00 0.00
 45-66 years -19.60 -19.54 -19.48
     
Basic and supplementary benefit Have basic and supplementary benefit 2.95 2.92 3.03
 Have no basic and supplementary benefit 0.00 0.00 0.00
     
Child maintenance Pay maintenance 25.38 25.32 25.15
 Do not pay maintenance 0.00 0.00 0.00
     
Disability Disabled 17.60 17.44 17.32
 Not disabled 0.00 0.00 0.00
     
Long-term unemployed Long-term unemployed 49.72 49.29 49.30
 Not long-term unemployed 0.00 0.00 0.00
Scale (σ)   59.04 58.93 58.63
Log Likelihood  -757135 -755920 -754822
Pseudo R2  0.07 0.07 0.07
Number of individuals  2529612 2526737 2529507
Number of municipalities  435 429* 434
* Data for alcohol-related hospitalizations are missing in 6 municipalities. 
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Table 5.2. Average expected social assistance and probability of receiving social assistance by 
population subgroups 
Dependent variable: Received social assistance (in 1000 NOK)       Model 2   
   1000 NOK  Percent 
Variable Group/State E(S|z)   P(S>0|z)*100
Constant   1.11  3.8
     
Gender Female 1.00  3.5
  Male 1.21  4.1
     
Country background Norwegian 0.95  3.4
  Western countries 1.64  5.4
  Non-Western countries 6.63  17.3
     
Education level Lower education 1.87  6.1
  Medium education 1.28  4.4
  Higher education 0.24  1.0
     
Family status Single 2.54  8.3
  Married without children 0.15  0.7
  Married with children 0.33  1.4
  Mother with children 3.05  9.6
  Father with children 1.66  5.8
  Cohabitation with at least one common child 0.98  3.7
     
Age group Below 30 years  1.87  6.1
  30-45 years 1.25  4.2
  45-66 years 0.54  2.1
     
Basic and supplementary benefit Have basic and supplementary benefit 2.29  7.2
  Have no basic and supplementary benefit 1.07  3.7
     
Child maintenance Pay maintenance 3.79  11.5
  Do not pay maintenance 0.97  3.4
     
Disability Disabled 1.76  5.9
  Not disabled 1.04  3.6
     
Long-term unemployed Long-term unemployed 6.93  18.8
  Not long-term unemployed 0.78   3.0
Scale (σ)  58.93   
Log Likelihood  -755920.49   
Pseudo R2  0.07   
Number of individuals  2526737   
Number of communities   429    
 
Table 5.2 displays the expected social assistance and estimated probabilities for the respective 
population subgroups calculated from the estimated coefficients of Model 2. Comparing Tables 4.1 
and 5.2 it is found that the estimated probabilities predict the observed frequencies of recipients fairly 
well for different subpopulations. Moreover, the model predictions for expected social assistance are 
fairly close to the reported average levels for different population subgroups in Table 4.1. One 
exception is disability status where those not disabled on average receive more social assistance than 
the disabled, while our model predicts higher expected social assistance for the disabled. 
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Table 5.2 shows that the estimated probabilities and expected payments are particularly high for non-
western immigrants and long-term unemployed. About one out of five persons with these 
characteristics receive social assistance. Their expected social assistance is about six times the average 
expected social assistance. People paying maintenance, lone mothers with children and singles are 
other groups with a high probability of receiving social assistance. About one out of ten in these 
groups receive social assistance. They also receive a larger amount of social assistance than the 
average level. Married persons have a low probability of receiving social assistance. They also have an 
expected level of social assistance fairly below the average level. People above 45 years of age and 
those not long-term employed have substantially lower probabilities of receiving social assistance than 
the population average. 
 
5.3. Priorities across municipalities 
Effects of variables on the municipality level are displayed in Table 5.3. The results are based on 
Model 2. As can be seen from the log likelihood and the pseudo R2 for the different models in Table 
5.1, the community variables have low explanatory power. Moreover, some of the coefficients are not 
statistically significant. The statistically insignificant coefficients include the coefficients for the 
housing price level in the community, traveling distance to the municipal center, spread in the 
education level and the population share above 66 years of age. The other coefficients are significantly 
different from zero at the 5 percent significance level. However, it is relevant to focus mainly on 
economic significance, measured by the elasticity of a one percent change in one of the municipal 
variables, when everything else is constant. The formula used to calculate the elasticity is given in the 
Appendix. 
 
At the core of the analysis is the question of whether or not the different political theories are 
supported by the estimation results. According to the ideology/partisanship model we would expect 
that the community should give more social assistance the higher the share of socialist representatives 
in the local government council. The results of Table 5.3 yield little support for this hypothesis, since 
the elasticity is rather low, indicating no economic significant effect of this variable. 
 
The pressure group/stakeholder model implies a negative relationship between the share of 
children/elderly in the population and social assistance. Table 5.3 shows that the coefficient for the 
share of elderly has a positive sign, but with low statistical and economic significance. When it comes 
to the share of children in the population, the coefficient is negative as assumed from the hypothesis. 
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The elasticity also indicates that this effect is of some magnitude. A one percent increase in the share 
of children between 0 and 15 years of age gives on average a reduction of 0.64 percent in expected 
social assistance. Thus, the pressure group model is supported for families with children. 
 
Table 5.3. Tobit estimates and elasticities for the municipality level variables 
Dependent variable: Received social assistance (in 1000 NOK)  Model 2  
     
Variable Coefficient Standard error Elasticity
Constant -139.01 4.77  
    
Discretionary income per capita (1000 NOK) -0.16 0.03 -0.05
     
Average municipal housing price per square meter (1000 NOK) 0.13 0.11 0.03
    
Ideology/partisanship     
Percent socialists in the local government council 0.03 0.01 0.04
    
Pressure groups/stakeholders     
Population share 0-15 years -89.31 11.15 -0.64
Population share 67 years and above 7.86 7.96 0.04
  
Distance/diversity  
Average traveling time to the municipal center (minutes) -0.02 0.02 -0.01
Spread in the educational level (standard deviation in years of schooling) 0.20 0.72 0.02
Population share of non-western immigrants -44.95 17.58 -0.02
Gross migration per capita -12.81 5.60 -0.04
  
Community opportunity     
Population share with low education -61.16 9.00 -0.14
Population growth 1993-1998 per capita 0.20 0.05 0.02
Unemployment rate (percent) 4.37 0.32 0.17
Population share that is disabled 75.89 10.41 0.14
Alcohol related hospitalizations per inhabitant 139.75 193.49 0.01
Population share 67 years and above 7.86 7.96 0.04
  
Scale (σ) 58.93  
Log Likelihood -755920  
Pseudo R2 0.07  
Number of individuals 2526737  
Number of municipalities 429  
 
From the distance/diversity model the hypothesis is that geographical, social and cultural distances are 
negatively related to the priority of local redistribution. The average travel distance to the local 
municipal center is used to measure the impact of geographical distances. The coefficient for this 
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variable is negative but not statistically significant. The elasticity also shows low economic 
significance. 
 
The social distance within a municipality is measured by the spread in education level and the gross 
rate of migration. A large spread in the education level implies that the distance between the 
inhabitants is large along the social dimension, while a higher gross migration per capita also implies 
higher social distances. The elasticities for these variables are quite low, so their economic significance 
is low. 
 
Cultural distance is measured by the share of immigrants from non-western countries. The hypothesis 
is that a higher share of immigrants with a remote cultural background lowers the preferences for local 
redistribution through social assistance. The coefficient for this variable is negative, but it is not of any 
economic significance. 
 
The community opportunity hypothesis states that the need for social assistance is higher in 
communities with bad economic opportunities, and is captured by the population share with low 
education, share of the population above 66 years of age, population share of disabled, population 
growth, unemployment rate and alcohol related hospitalizations. There is some support for this 
hypothesis as concerns the share of disabled and unemployed, although the elasticities are rather low 
for these variables. 
 
Discretionary income per capita is included to estimate the income elasticity of social assistance. The 
coefficient for this variable is negative and the elasticity is low. This implies that discretionary income 
is not allocated to social assistance, and the support for local redistribution does not differ between 
"rich" and "poor" municipalities. Furthermore, the coefficient for the average housing price in the 
municipality is both statistically and economically insignificant. Thus, the results do not support the 
hypothesis that higher housing prices are compensated by higher social assistance payments. 
 
5.4. Analysis of expected social assistance for a reference person 
We define a reference person in the analysis by the following individual characteristics: Male, 
Norwegian country background, low education level, single, age below 30 years, receives no basic and 
supplementary benefit, pays no maintenance, is not disabled and is not long-term unemployed.  
For a reference person the expected social assistance varies only as a function of municipality. The 
municipality level variation in expected social assistance is picked up by the municipality dummies in 
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Model 3. Thus, Model 3 is used to simulate the expected social assistance for the reference person in 
each municipality. The average amount of expected social assistance for the reference person is NOK 
4400 with a standard deviation of NOK 1200. The minimum and maximum values are NOK 1000 and 
NOK 9000, respectively.9 
 
Table 5.4. Ordinary least squares regressions for the reference person* 
Dependent variable: Expected social assistance (in 1000 NOK) for the reference person    
                        Model A                   Model B 
Variable Coefficient t-value  Coefficient t-value
Constant 1.32 0.59  2.74 1.43
      
Discretionary income per capita (1000 NOK) -0.01 -1.11  -0.01 -1.11
      
Average municipal housing price per square meter (1000 NOK) -0.07 -0.95  -0.02 -0.34
      
Ideology/partisanship      
Percent socialists in the local government council 0.01 1.12  0.01 1.13
      
Pressure groups/stakeholders      
Population share 0-15 years -1.56 -0.34  -2.32 -0.52
Population share 67 years and above 4.79 1.38  4.14 1.29
      
Distance/diversity      
Average traveling time to the municipal center (minutes) -0.01 -1.46  -0.01 -1.48
Spread in the educational level (standard deviation in years of schooling) 0.04 0.11  0.13 0.35
Population share of non-western immigrants 0.82 0.06  4.33 0.32
Gross migration per capita 6.48 1.96  4.94 1.68
Inverse population size (in 1000 inhabitants) 0.33 0.90    
The logarithm of the population 0.17 1.24    
      
Community opportunity      
Population share with low education -8.06 -2.20  -8.10 -2.23
Population growth 1993-1998 per capita 0.01 0.50  0.01 0.63
Unemployment rate (percent) 0.44 3.33  0.47 3.60
Population share that is disabled 15.18 3.29  15.91 3.48
Alcohol related hospitalizations per inhabitant 65.41 0.75  73.76 0.86
R2-adjusted 0.13   0.13  
Number of communities 429   429  
* The reference person: Male, 16-30 years of age, single, Norwegian, lower education, pays no maintenance, 
receives no basic and supplementary benefit, is not disabled and is not long-term unemployed.   
 
To further examine if there are any differences in priorities between municipalities, explanatory 
variables on the municipal level are included in regression models of expected social assistance for the 
reference person. The results are displayed in Table 5.4. The variables inverse population size and the 
logarithm of the population are included in Model A, but not in Model B. The results from these 
regressions are much in line with the results from the Tobit regressions in Section 5.3. The various 
political theories of distribution find little support, while there is some support for the community 
                                                 
9 For comparison, the distribution of incomes after taxes is reported in Table 5.5. 
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opportunity hypothesis. The coefficients for the unemployment rate and the share of disabled are 
statistically significant with the expected positive signs. Since residents in municipalities with high 
rates of unemployment or disablement may face bad economic opportunities, the reference person's 
need for social assistance is higher in such municipalities. Moreover, this result is found to be robust 
with respect to the choice of reference person.10 
 
6. Decomposition of private incomes by income components 
Social assistance is included as a component in the definition of private incomes after taxes, which is 
the conventional definition of income in analyses of income inequality in Norway. Based on the 
econometric analysis in this paper we are able to further decompose social assistance for each 
individual on expected social assistance ( )ijz|SE ij  and a residual term ( )ijz|SEs ijij − . Thus, incomes 
after taxes are decomposed on expected social assistance, residual social assistance, and other income 
sources. Other income sources include market incomes, cash transfers from the central government, 
and taxes (which are deducted). The decomposition on expected and residual social assistance is based 
on Model 3 with municipality fixed effects. 
 
Table 5.5. Average incomes after taxes by deciles and income components, NOK 1998 
Decile Incomes after taxes Expected social assistance Residual  social assistance Other income sources
Decile 1 87 150 3 090 1 920 82 150
Decile 2 139 710 2 220 -100 137 590
Decile 3 166 460 1 480 -290 165 260
Decile 4 187 570 1 150 -390 186 810
Decile 5 206 870 930 -340 206 280
Decile 6 226 290 760 -280 225 820
Decile 7 247 540 630 -250 247 160
Decile 8 273 460 540 -210 273 130
Decile 9 311 560 470 -210 311 290
Decile 10 501 110 390 -210 500 930
All deciles 234 770 1 170 -40 233 640
 
In the empirical analysis above a large part of the variation in social assistance is left unexplained. The 
explanatory power of the Tobit model is not significantly higher in the model with municipality 
dummies. Since these fixed effects capture the impact of different priorities across municipalities, the 
unexplained variation is not due to unobserved heterogeneity at the municipal level. Thus, the 
unexplained variation could either be purely random, or result from unobserved heterogeneity in 
recipient needs, or result from a distribution that is unjust or corrupt. The official aim of social 
assistance is to alleviate poverty and contribute to lower income inequality. To achieve a legitimate 
                                                 
10 The regression model has been tested on six different reference persons, where the reference persons have been chosen to 
represent different types of clients.  
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distribution it is thus required that social assistance should be concentrated in the lower deciles of 
incomes after taxes. 
 
Table 5.5 shows that expected social assistance is decreasing with higher deciles of incomes after 
taxes. Moreover, the average residual social assistance is positive in the first decile, and is negative in 
all higher deciles. The residual component is distributed in a fashion that is strongly equalizing, and is 
thus likely to be related to unobserved heterogeneity in recipient needs. Yet, some caution is required 
in the interpretation of this result, since incomes after taxes are affected by individual choices, and 
clients may reduce their labor supply in response to granted social assistance. Individuals with a high 
productive potential may act strategically to receive social assistance by concealing their true 
economic opportunities, although they must be willing to reduce their productive effort and standard of 
living in order to be treated as clients. An aspect worth to mention is that there is a positive average 
amount of social assistance in all decile groups, meaning that also some people with high incomes 
receive social assistance. 
  
7. Summary and conclusion 
The purpose of this paper is to explain variation in local government redistribution policies while 
controlling for needs and economic opportunities in the local population. Discrete-continuous models 
for the allocation of social assistance on individuals are estimated, where the expected social assistance 
is assumed to vary as a function of individual and municipal characteristics. The individual 
characteristics account for variation in needs and economic opportunities, while the municipal 
characteristics account for variation in community opportunity and political support for redistribution. 
Different political theories are tested to account for partisan politics, interest group pressures and local 
support for redistribution. By including individual characteristics as well as variables on the municipal 
level we are able to separate the impact of individual needs from the impact of different priorities 
across municipalities. For instance, a high population share of ethnic minorities in a municipality may 
increase the need for welfare transfers and reduce the political support for redistribution. The 
estimation results show that the first effect is significant while the latter is not. 
 
The political theories that explain different priorities across municipalities find little support in the 
empirical analysis. By contrast, the results show that social assistance payments received by 
individuals who have low education level, background from non-western countries, suffer from 
disablement or long-term unemployment, or belong to families with a single adult (with or without 
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children) are relatively high. Consequently the evaluation of needs seems to be a crucial factor behind 
the distribution of social assistance, which may imply that the scope for local government priorities is 
limited by legal regulations. This conclusion is supported by the fact that social assistance is relatively 
high among families with low private incomes after taxes. Moreover, the unexplained residual 
variation in social assistance is distributed to the benefit of the 10 percent of the population with the 
lowest incomes after taxes. 
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Appendix 
Maximum likelihood estimation 
The log-likelihood function for the Tobit model is 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]∑∑
0s
s2
0s ij
2
2
ij
ij
1loglog2log
2
1Llog
=
σσ
>
Φ+⎥⎦
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⎡ +σ+π= αzαz ijij  
 
Olsen (1978) reparameterized this log-likelihood function by letting /σαγ =  and σ/1θ = . 
The maximum likelihood estimators are obtained by maximizing log L with respect to γ  and θ . 
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1Llog
=>
Φ+θ+θπ= γzγz ijij  
 
The parameters of the original model can then be recovered by using that θ/1σ =  and /θγα = . 
 
Elasticities 
It is of interest to examine the effects of marginal changes in the exogenous variables on the municipal 
level on the expected value of social assistance and the probability of receiving social assistance.  
Equation (4.2) shows the expression for the expected amount of social assistance conditional on the 
explanatory variables. The elasticity of ( )z|SE  with respect to kz  is given by 
 
(A.3) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )σˆ/ˆσˆˆσˆ/ˆ
zˆ
σˆ/ˆ
zlog∂
|SElog∂ kk
k αzαzαz
αzz φ+Φ
αΦ= , 
 
where zk is the value of a continuous explanatory variable k that varies across municipalities, and kαˆ  
is the corresponding estimated coefficient. To simplify the notation indices for individual i and 
municipality j have been omitted in equation (A.3). The expression ( )σˆ/αˆijzΦ  is the estimated 
probability of observing positive social assistance given the explanatory variables. The estimated 
probability is in the interval (0,1) and has a positive value. Moreover, the denominator in (A.3) is the 
conditional expected social assistance, which is positive. Thus, the sign of the elasticity of the 
explanatory variables on the expected amount of social assistance is the same as for the coefficient kαˆ . 
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Likewise from (4.3) the elasticity of ( )z|0SP >  with respect to kz  is calculated 
 
(A.4) ( ) ( ) ( )σˆ/ˆσˆ
zαˆ
σˆ/ˆ
zlog∂
|0SPlog∂ kk
k αz
αzz Φφ=
>  
 
The normal probability density ( )σˆ/αˆzφ  is positive, and the sign of the elasticity of the probability of 
receiving social assistance with respect to kz  is thus the same as the sign of the coefficient kαˆ . 
 
Logit estimations 
 
Table A1. Logit regressions. Coefficients for the individual characteristics 
Dependent variable: Received social assistance, w=1 if sij>0,     
                                 not receiving social assistance, w=0 if sij=0    
Variable Group/State Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant   -5.13 -4.85 -5.09
Gender Female 0 0 0
 Male 0.27 0.27 0.27
Country background Norwegian 0 0 0
 Western countries 0.43 0.42 0.42
  Non-Western countries 1.49 1.48 1.47
Education level Lower education 0.61 0.62 0.62
 Medium education 0 0 0
 Higher education -1.31 -1.31 -1.32
Family status Single 2.26 2.25 2.25
 Married without children 0 0 0
 Married with children 0.56 0.58 0.58
 Mother with children 2.12 2.12 2.13
 Father with children 1.74 1.74 1.75
 Cohabitation with at least one common child 1.34 1.34 1.36
Age group Below 30 years  0.33 0.33 0.33
 30-45 years 0 0 0
 45-66 years -0.72 -0.72 -0.73
Basic and supplementary benefit Recipient 0.02 0.02 0.02
 Non-recipient 0 0 0
Child maintenance Pay maintenance 0.96 0.96 0.96
 Do not pay maintenance 0 0 0
Disability Disabled 0.79 0.78 0.78
 Not disabled 0 0 0
Long-term unemployed Long-term unemployed 1.72 1.71 1.72
 Not long-term unemployed 0 0 0
-2 LOG Likelihood  657908 656308 653508
Pseudo R2  0.07 0.07 0.07
Number of individuals  2529612 2526737 2529507
Number of communities  435 429 434
All the coefficients, except the one for basic and supplementary benefit, are statistically significant.  
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Table A2. Average probability of receiving social assistance by population subgroups 
Dependent variable: Received social assistance, w=1 if sij>0,   Model 2 
                                 not receiving social assistance, w=0 if sij=0   
   Percent 
Variable Group/State P(sij>0|z)*100 
Constant   3.93 
     
Gender Female 3.68 
  Male 4.17 
     
Country background Norwegian 3.57 
  Western countries 5.39 
  Non-Western countries 16.19 
     
Education level Lower education 6.36 
  Medium education 4.56 
  Higher education 1.02 
     
Family status Single 8.49 
  Married without children 0.67 
  Married with children 1.37 
  Mother with children 10.48 
  Father with children 5.99 
  Cohabitation with at least one common child 3.96 
     
Age group Below 30 years  6.47 
  30-45 years 4.32 
  45-66 years 2.13 
     
Basic and supplementary benefit Have basic and supplementary benefit 7.63 
  Have no basic and supplementary benefit 3.81 
     
Child maintenance Pay maintenance 12.89 
  Do not pay maintenance 3.47 
     
Disability Disabled 6.57 
  Not disabled 3.65 
     
Long-term unemployed Long-term unemployed 20.18 
  Not long-term unemployed 3.02 
     
     
-2 LOG Likelihood  656308 
Pseudo R2  0.07 
Number of individuals  2526737 
Number of communities   429 
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Table A3. Logit estimates and elasticities for the variables on the municipal level 
Dependent variable: Received social assistance, w=1 if sij>0,   Model 2  
                                 not receiving social assistance, w=0 if sij=0    
    
Variable Coefficient Standard error Elasticity
Constant -4.85 0.17 
    
Discretionary income per capita (1000 NOK) -0.0061 0.0012 -0.0506
     
Ideology/partisanship 
Percent socialist in the local government council 0.0009 0.0004 0.0370
 
Pressure Groups/stakeholders     
Population share of 0-15 years -2.4946 0.3822 -0.5224
Population share 67  years and above 0.5477 0.2812 0.0766
 
Distance/Diversity 
Average traveling time to the municipal center (minutes) -0.0002 0.0006 -0.0030
Spread in the educational level (standard deviation in years of schooling) 0.0045 0.0246 0.0112
Population share of non-western immigrants -1.9593 0.5010 -0.0219
Gross migration per capita -0.2660 0.2018 -0.0250
 
Community opportunity 
Population share with low education -2.4121 0.3157 -0.1597
Population growth 1993-1998 per capita 0.0046 0.0018 0.0135
Unemployment rate (percent) 0.1642 0.0111 0.1865
Population share that is disabled 2.7978 0.3667 0.1547
Alcohol related hospitalizations per inhabitant 15.2075 6.7850 0.0198
Population share 67  years and above  0.5477 0.2812 0.0766
-2 LOG L 656508   
Pseudo R2 0.07  
Number of individuals 2526737   
Number of communities 429  
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Table A4. OLS regressions of the probability of receiving social assistance for the reference person*  
Dependent variable: Probability of receiving social assistance for the reference 
person            
                  Model A                    Model B                   Model C 
Variabel Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value  Coefficient t-value
Constant 0.06868 0.91  0.08828 1.38  0.08147 1.33
           
Discretionary income per capita (1000 NOK) -0.000273 -0.86  -0.00023 -0.88  -0.00022 -0.84
           
Ideology/partisanship          
Percent socialist in the local government council 0.000211 1.29  0.0002 1.29  0.00021 1.30
Mean price of housing in the community -0.0015 -0.60  -0.0008 -0.38     
            
Pressure groups/stakeholders          
Population share of 0-15 years 0.0065 0.04  -0.00137 -0.01  0.01246 0.09
Population share 67  years and above 0.17875 1.55  0.17317 1.61  0.18322 1.76
           
Distance/Diversity          
Average traveling time to the municipal center (minutes) -0.00034 -1.77  -0.00034 -1.82  -0.00035 -1.88
Spread in the educational level (std. in years of schooling) -0.00361 -0.28  -0.0026 -0.21  -0.00382 -0.32
Population share of non-western immigrants 0.08601 0.19  0.13545 0.30  0.0992 0.23
Gross migration per capita 0.20747 1.88  0.18791 1.91  0.18576 1.90
Inverse population (in 1000 inhabitants) 0.00557 0.46        
The logarithm of the population 0.00245 0.53        
           
Community opportunity          
Population share with low education -0.31238 -2.55  -0.31114 -2.57  -0.30521 -2.55
Population growth 1993-1998 per capita 0.0001 0.14  0.00013 0.18  0.00004 0.06
Unemployment rate (percent) 0.01676 3.81  0.01716 3.97  0.01733 4.03
Population share that is disabled 0.57641 3.74  0.58628 3.85  0.59552 3.96
Alcohol related hospitalizations per inhabitant 2.47972 0.86  2.56971 0.90  2.58946 0.90
           
           
R2-adjusted 0.1497   0.1531   0.1549   
Number of communities 429   429   429   
            
* The reference person: Male, 16-30 years of age, single, Norwegian, lower education, pays no maintenance,   
receives no basic and supplementary benefit, is not disabled and is not long-term unemployed.       
 
Variables 
 
Individual characteristics 
 
Gender 
Male and female 
 
Country background  
Norwegians: People from Norway. 
Western countries: Immigrants from Europe, Australia or North-America. 
Non-Western countries: Immigrants from countries in Asia, Africa, Latin- and South-America or 
Turkey. 
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Education level 
Lower education: 0 - 9 years of schooling 
Medium education: 10 - 12 years of schooling 
Higher education: Above 12 years of schooling 
 
Family status 
Single 
Married without children 
Married with children 
Mother with children 
Father with children 
Cohabitation with at least one common child 
 
Age groups 
Below 30 years 
30-44 years 
45-66 years 
 
Basic and supplementary benefit 
Basic benefit is given to people having significant extra expenses because of a permanent disease or 
disablement 
Supplementary benefit is given to people in need of special care or help at home because of a disease 
or disablement 
 
Pays maintenance 
Maintenance for own children when one is not living together with the children 
 
Disablement status 
Permanently ill or disabled 
 
Long-term unemployed 
Persons registered as unemployed for at least 2 years (our definition in this paper) 
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Municipal level variables 
 
Discretionary income per capita (1000 NOK) 
Tax income and contributions from the central government minus estimated expenditure needs 
 
Average municipal housing price per square meter (1000 NOK) 
Average municipal housing price per square meter in 1000 NOK for used freeholder houses in 1998. 
We group municipalities with few houses sold by counties to handle uncertainty due to few 
observations (houses sold) in small municipalities. 
 
Percent socialists in the local government council 
Percent share of politicians in the local government council representing parties on the political left 
 
Average traveling time to the municipal center (minutes) 
Average traveling distance, measured in minutes, from home to the municipal center for the 
inhabitants in the municipality 
 
Spread in the educational level (standard deviation in years of schooling) 
A measure of the spread in years of schooling calculated as the standard deviation of years of 
schooling 
 
Population share of non-western immigrants 
Population share of immigrants from countries in Asia, Africa, Latin- and South-America or Turkey 
 
Population share with low education 
Population share of residents with 9 years of schooling or less 
 
Population growth 1993-1998 
 
Gross migration per capita 
Number of persons moving in or out of the municipality in percent of the inhabitants. Calculated as the 
average for the last 10 years 
 
Population share 67 years and above 
 34
Unemployment rate (percent) 
People 0-59 years unemployed in the municipality in percent of the inhabitants 
 
Population share that is disabled 
Share of people in the municipality that are disabled in percent of inhabitants 
 
Alcohol related hospitalizations per inhabitant  
Number of hospitalizations due to alcohol related diagnoses during the period 1996-1998 per capita 
 
Inverse population size 
1000 / population size. 
 
The logarithm of the population 
log (population) 
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